Behavioural approaches have become mainstream in economics, supported by the research of cognitive scientists and psychologists, yet their findings have attracted little attention from geographers. This article argues for a renewed behavioural economic geography that builds on research in behavioural economics but also addresses one of its main shortcomings: a lack of engagement with the social context of decisionmaking. I outline a research agenda that bridges the gap between the disciplines in the area of pension decision-making, using the example of choice in UK occupational plans to argue for a mixed methodological approach to meet the challenge of taking context seriously.
Introduction
In the late 1980s and early 1990s economic geographers engaged in a debate about the validity of the 'strong' conception of economic rationality that finds expression in rational choice theory (RCT).
1 Like the behavioural geography of two decades earlier (see for example Gale, 1972; Cullen, 1977; c.f. Sayer and Duncan, 1977) , the debate was a reaction to the 'rigid, mechanistic form of agency implied by the neoclassical actor' (Hanson, 2006) . The terms of the discussion, however, reflected the growing influence of the New Economic Sociology (NES) following the publication of Granovetter's 1985 paper Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness (see Peck, 2005 for an overview) and was part of the project to 'socialise' the economic, to '. . . make clear that a geographical concern with space and place soon widens the focus from individual rationality to collective forms of action and social forms of learning' (Hanson and Peet, 1992, iv) . Like the earlier strain of behavioural geography, the NES-influenced critique of the rational actor model has arguably been important in the 'cultural turn' and the emergence of relational economic geography (Bathelt, 2003; Bathelt and Gluckler, 2005; Yeung, 2005 ), yet it has remained an undercurrent in recent debates about the current shape and future focus of economic geography as a discipline.
Behavioural approaches have, meanwhile, been gaining ground in the field of economics, bolstered by the work of cognitive scientists concerned with documenting diversity in how people make decisions. Behavioural economics, the combination of psychology and economics that investigates 'the impacts of human limitations and complications on markets' (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2002: emphasis added) , entered the mainstream of the discipline after the psychologist Daniel Kahneman (along with Vernon Smith) won the 1992 Nobel Prize for economics. Behavioural economics and behavioural finance have dared to challenge the primacy of the strong model of the rationality, embodied by homo economicus, by illustrating and theorising real-world decision-making behaviours. Thus economists studying decision-making have discovered the relevance approaches grounded in cognitive science and psychology even as behaviouralism in geography has waned.
The gulf between economic geography and what Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) call geographical economics has widened in the last decade due to methodological and theoretical differences (Plummer and Sheppard, 2006; Sheppard, 2006) while economic geographers continue to express concern about the coherence and relevance their discipline. Yet one of the major points of contention and disagreement-that for geographical economists, the organisation of capitalist space-economy is the result of equilibrium outcomes of the choices made by rational, utility-maximsing individualsis the subject of critique for behavioural economists. This is not to say that the fundamental ontology of behavioural economics is aligned with that of critical economic geographers who focus on theorising the social and cultural embeddedness of economic actors. It does, however, suggest the possibility of mutually-constructive rapprochement.
Moreover, if economic geographers are genuinely concerned with the question of relevance than they ignore the rise of behaviouralism in economics at their peril. Its growth has been concomitant with the increasing centrality of the ideology of individualism and the mantra of choice in the Anglo-American world, '. . . so that competition and choice now provide the principles for public sector reform programmes' (Jordan, 2005, 143) . In the UK, for example, strong assumptions are being made about the economic rationality and decision-making competence of individuals in areas of government policy such as health, pensions and education (see for example Clark et al., 2005; Bate and Robert, 2006) . The 'choice agenda' does not only concern state-provided public services: in occupational pensions in the UK and US there has been a marked shift from defined benefit (DB) or final salary schemes to defined contribution (DC) or money purchase schemes, which emerged in the 1980s in the US.
2 Individualised risk, responsibility and choice are at the heart of the DC model, yet inertia and low levels of personal saving suggest that individuals have difficulty making appropriate decisions. In the case of pensions 'irrational' decision-making can have a significant effect on an individual's welfare in old age, exacerbating the sense of a looming 'pensions crisis'. Individualisation and the choice agenda, concomitant with the privatisation of services and the creation of new markets in welfare, are 'neoliberal' processes of the recent phase of capitalism (Peck, 2002) underpinned by a model of economic decision-making grounded in the RCT. Research from within the discipline of economics illustrating problems with this model, such as evidence of sub-optimal savings choices in DC plans has been, has been conducted by primarily by behavioural economists and is gaining increasing traction in broader economic and policy circles.
This article utilises the example of occupational pensions to develop a research agenda relevant to economic geography that aims to bridge the gap between economics and geography in the area of research on economic decision-making. While acknowledging the critiques of positivistic behavioural geography, especially the tendency to conceptualise individuals as atomistic rather than socially embedded, I argue in this article that a renewed behavioural economic geography, borne out of an engagement with behavioural economics, signals two opportunities. The first is for economic geographers to utilise and build on recent behavioural research on decisionmaking without adopting, wholesale, its ways of conceptualising economic man (sic). The second opportunity is for economic geographers to enrich current behavioural approaches by taking seriously the notion of context. The theoretical and methodological debates surrounding behaviouralism and rationality in geography, rather than foreclosing engagement, instead suggest ways of specifying and incorporating contextual factors into studies of 'real world' economic decision-making.
There is a paucity of empirical work that grapples with context in pension decisionmaking. I do not present new research of this type; the article is intended, instead, as a call to action. The first section describes geographical, economic and psychological approaches to economic decision-making and the limitations of each. I then outline the macro context of pension decision-making in occupational DC plans, though the account is necessarily truncated. A discussion of recent research by economic geographers on pension-decision-making follows, and I highlight some of the shortcomings of the studies that engage with behavioural economics and cognitive science. These limitations, I suggest, could be tackled by the application of quantitative empirical and qualitative approaches to understanding attitudes towards risk, responsibility and the exercise of choice. Because there are no 'real world' research examples to draw on, I construct a synthetic case (pace Clark, 1981) to illustrate how an approach grounded in mixed methods could yield new insights. In the final section I discuss the lineaments of an analytical framework that combines psychological theories of cognition with a definition of context that picks up where the rationality debate left off, following Gertler's (2003) lead in focusing on the concept of embeddedness and the role of institutions. I conclude with some final thoughts on the importance of the pensions research agenda.
Behaviouralism and economic decision-making
The work of many economists and some economic geographers interested in decisionmaking is underpinned by ontological assumption that human beings are natural utility maximises (Clark, 2003) . As Pred (1967, 6) commented in his critique of location theory, '. . . the decision-making individual is not plagued with imperfect knowledge . . . or any of the frailty of real-world human beings . . . In common with the economic man of other forms of economic theory, the location decision-maker . . . ''has a single profit . . . goal, omniscient powers, of perception, reasoning and computation, and . . . perfect predictive abilities'' '. In economics this model of behaviour is embodied in the selfishness axiom, which is the assumption that individuals seek to maximise their own material gains and expect others to behave in the same way (Henrich et al., 2005) . Other attributes of rationality include stable and coherent preferences, the ability to construct an exhaustive set of alternative strategies for every decision, and a probability distribution of scenarios for the future associated with each strategy (Simon, 1983; Rabin, 1998) . The 'golden rule' of utility maximisation is universally applied: 'By this one assumption the complex matters of context, deliberation and planning are resolved at a stroke of the pen' (Clark, 2003, 129) . Presumed universality leads to binary characterisations of irrational (bad) behaviour and rational (good) behaviour based on the rules of individual maximisation, ignoring the social context on which normative validity in fact depends (Gigerenzer, 2000) .
Geographical approaches
Despite its canonical status in neoclassical economics, which largely inspired the quantitative revolution in geography, the behavioural approaches that emerged in the late 1960s sought to challenge the model of the individual as a wholly rational, omniscient, a-social individual (Hanson, 2006) . Behavioural geography took aim at the assumptions underpinning this model and set out to humanise homo economicus, '. . . to recognize that people do not have complete information, are not always distance minimizing, are embedded in networks of social relations, and therefore may base decisions on factors other than sheer economic rationality' (Ibid: 28). Moreover, it specifically recognised the role of cognition and the importance of social and cultural values and constraints, plus '. . . all the institutional, economic and physical factors that characterise the public, ''objective'' environment' (Couclelis and Golledge, 1983) . In this sense the model of economic decision-making employed by behavioural geographers, at least in theory, had affinities with the one proposed by the economist and political scientist Herbert Simon (1982) , also a Nobel prize winner in economics, sometime later. Simon conceptualised the decision-making moment as the coming together of the twin blades of a pair of scissors, one representing cognition and the other the decisionmaking environment.
Behavioural geography was, however, an outgrowth of the spatial analysis of the 1960s rather than a radical departure from it, epistemologically and especially methodologically. Pred (1967, 7) summarised the criticisms of the economic man hypothesis in the theory of the firm as belonging to three groups: those that disputed the logical consistency of its assumptions, those that questioned the motives attributed to economic man and those that rejected the cognitive abilities and perfect knowledge attributed to economic man. The a-social characterisation of economic man was not directly challenged. This left behavioural geography open to criticism on two fronts: that it was inherently positivist, and thus, despite its aims, that it severed individuals from their social and cultural contexts (Couclelis and Golledge, 1983) . The second blade of Simon's scissors remained under-specified. The rise of the cultural and qualitative 'turns' in human geography signalled behavioural geography's demise and by the 1990s few geographers writing about the spatiality of human behaviour acknowledged any links with quantitative behavioural geography (but see for example Hanson and Pratt, 1995; McLafferty, 1995) .
Yet for all that it failed to fundamentally challenge the a-social conception of the individual agent, behavioural geography nevertheless succeeded in problematising the assumptions used by geographers in modelling and analysing economic decisionmaking. Recent work by economic geographers recognises the importance of context, but also the difficulties of defining, specifying and applying context in analytically useful ways (Smith and Easterlow, 2005) : as Gertler (2003, 90) points out, the appreciation of context in work on tacit knowledge has been 'mostly lip service'. What is also striking about geographical research on economic decision-making is that it tends to focus on organisations, institutions and aggregate level behaviour rather than on individual decision-makers. Conversely, the broader interest in cultures of consumption in human geography has led to an efflorescence of research related to people's consumption decisions and behaviours, yet these studies mostly eschew behavioural approaches.
The two sides of this coin are reflected in geographical work on pensions. Recent papers on trustee (Clark et al., 2005) and member (Clark and Strauss, in press; Knox-Hayes and Clark, 2007) decision-making recognise the importance of context but employ methodological approaches derived from the fields of cognitive science and behavioural economics, which marginalise social, cultural and political factors (while acknowledging the importance of socio-demographic variables). Research on pension issues has focused predominantly on macro-level trends (Clark, 2003 (Clark, , 2006 Clark and Whiteside, 2003) , pension finance and investment management (Clark et al., 2001 (Clark et al., , 2002 Tickell, 2003; Clark and Monk, 2006) ; there has been a 'relative neglect of pension consumption' (Sunley, 2000, 484) , especially in the UK. On the other hand, the interest in financial consumption more broadly has produced research on consumer access to financial products and services (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995; Alexander and Pollard, 2000) , financial literacy (Cutler, 1997; Leyshon et al., 1998) , the growing importance of the financial media in shaping the production and consumption of financial products (Clark et al., 2004; Cronqvist, 2005; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) , and differences in local 'ecologies' of finance (Leyshon et al., 2004) , which has striven to document the importance of social, cultural and political factors in consumption choices.
Approaches from economics and cognitive science
The field of behavioural economics marries insights from psychology with the 'parsimony' and 'tractability' of economic methods to make the modelling of behavioural outcomes more realistic (Rabin, 1998) , as well as using experimental methods from cognitive science to explore 'real world' decision-making behaviours. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have been extremely influential in the field, challenging Bernoulli's (1954) model of Expected Utility Theory by insisting on the reference-dependence of choice in decision-making (Kahneman, 2002) .
3 Their research has demonstrated, among other things, that most humans are more risk averse than economic theory predicts but also inconsistent in their attitudes towards risk, that people heavily discount the future (if they have coherent discount functions), and are inefficient users of information. Tversky and Kahneman's project of challenging the tenets of RCT has not been undertaken alone, however: Simon in economics and Gerd Gigerenzer in psychology, for example, have pursued related programmes of research. Their focus, taking modern evolutionary biology as a starting point, has been to map the cognitive abilities, capacities and limits of human choice under conditions of risk and uncertainty. It is clear that their project has particular salience in societies characterised by the domination of markets, the individualisation of welfare and neoliberal presumptions in favour of self-reliance (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003) . Trends such as the financialisation and individualisation of pensions are the in part the product of a political ideology that has economic rationality and utility maximisation at its heart.
4
The insights of behavioural economists have allowed social scientists to acknowledge certain unique traits specific to humans as a species as rationality without succumbing to an ontological position that posits utility maximisation as an a priori foundation of human behaviour. Their research also suggests that denying the significance of cognitive factors in favour of theories that give primacy to social and cultural explanations, despite the caveats attached to experimental research conducted in university settings with groups of undergraduate students (but see Henrich et al., 2005) , risks missing a fundamental piece of the puzzle of economic decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. There are, in this sense, at least four key concepts derived from research carried under the rubric of behavioural economics that have particular resonance and utility for economic geographers. These are that human rationality is in practice bounded, that people utilise heuristics (mental short cuts) rather than exhaustive optimisation strategies, that intuition and imitation play an important role in how people make choices, and that preferences (including risk tolerance) are not stable but are affected by context and framing.
The insight that human rationality is bounded was first discussed by Simon in 1956 (Simon, 1956 . He posited that strong notions of rationality involving optimisation fail to describe the real-life behaviour of individual agents, circumscribed by heterogeneous goals and resources. These resources are not only material (e.g. informational) but also cognitive: they describe both ability and knowledge. Simon also acknowledged that the actual process of decision-making influences decisions. His notion of bounded rationality preserves, however, the assumption that individuals are naturally rational in the choices they make, whilst relaxing one or more of the assumptions of standard expected utility theory. Later research on the importance of heuristics expanded this theory of constrained rationality. Heuristics are context-specific rules of thumb which allow people to make choices without employing exhaustive strategies of deliberation: there is recognition among researchers that heuristics are often effective and can be efficient, especially in complex situations and under time constraints. Kahneman (2003) , (see also Gigerenzer et al., 1999) goes so far as to suggest that deliberation can result in over-elaborate assessment when the challenges inherent in processing information in real-world contexts are taken into account.
The context sensitivity of heuristics (that individuals apply rule of thumb X in situation Y subject to Z, where Z represents similarities or differences in experiences or situations judged to be related) opens the door to the relevance of social learning. The role of intuition further emphasises the importance of not just social and cultural embeddedness, but also emotion. The concept of intuition employed by behavioural scientists is a fairly basic one involving individuals' confidence their course of action (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) : it nevertheless highlights action over deliberation, immediate response over deliberation and confidence over calibration, making it in essence pre-reflexive. Imitation, itself often an intuitive reaction to a specific decisioncontext, more is more directly indicative of the 'deeply social' nature of human rationality; this sense of social embeddedness is often missing from behavioural accounts of economic decision-making (see Krueger and Funder, 2005) . The findings that people do not have consistent attitudes to risk, and that their responses to problems are affected by the ways in which those problems are framed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 , 1984 , again signal the importance of context and environment in decision-making. Yet a significant weakness of the behavioural economics literature is that context itself is underdetermined and remains largely untheorised.
5
The process of making choices about DC occupational pension plan saving, an idealtype example of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; , highlights both the strengths and weakness of the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of behavioural economics. As Mitchell and Utkus (2004, 3) point out, in order to solve the 'retirement puzzle' of saving optimally for old age, '. . . the human brain as a calculating machine would need to have the capacity to solve many decades-long time value of money problems, with massive uncertainties as to stochastic cash flows and their timing'. Empirical research has in fact shown that many individuals exhibit precisely the behaviours described by Tversky and Kahneman. 6 (a) Individuals making decisions about pension saving exhibit bounded self-control.
That is, they may have appropriate and rational intentions or beliefs but they lack the 'willpower' to carry out the required changes in their behaviour (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000) . (b) Individuals also evince bounded self-interest or bounded selfishness. Rather than acting solely to maximise their personal utility, the 'problem' is that people are more altruistic and cooperative than economic theory predicts (Mitchell and Utkus, 2004) . In other words, individuals make decisions about their pensions with others in mind. (c) Rather than having consistent preferences and discount rates, people do not evince stable preferences (Benartzi and Thaler, 2002) and are hyperbolic discounters (Laibson et al., 1998) . They apply high discount rates in the context of near-term decisions, but relatively low discount rates to the long-term future. (d) Rational economic agents should not be expected to alter their behaviour depending on how questions are asked, on how choices framed or depending on the actions of their peers, colleagues and families. Pension plan design has, however, been shown to affect behaviour (Madrian and Shea, 2000; Choi et al., 2001 Choi et al., , 2004 and Saez (2002, 2003) have demonstrated that peer/ colleague and family interactions can strongly influence savings decisions (see above). (e) In the case of investment behaviour people treat gains and losses differently: they are more risk averse concerning gains and more willing to indulge in risky behaviour when they are faced with loses (Kahneman, 2003) . This is a significant issue in light of the range and complexity of the risks people face, such as longevity risk, inflation and capital market risks.
The evidence of sub-optimal decision-making in pensions amounts to a significant challenge to the strong model of economic rationality. Yet theoretically, behavioural economics approaches often seem limited to the characterisation of behaviour as irrational if it deviates from the idealised norm, or to recognizing optimisation under constraints. Moreover, it still portrays individuals as autonomous, unconnected agents and continues to downplay the role of context and environment (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001 ).
Choice, risk and responsibility in UK occupational DC pensions
What follows is an illustration of how economic geographers might engage with and utilise the work of behavioural economists to add strength to research on questions of interest to both disciplines. The approach I am advocating is halfway between the position adopted by Kitchin et al. (1997) , who saw the potential for an alliance of first principles and a place in geography for radical behaviouralism, and Hobson (2006, 293) , who shied away from this position to suggest that geographers should '. . . at least borrow from and/or converse with' in his case, environmental psychology. I sympathise with both camps but want to suggest that it is possible for economic geographers to embrace the methodological and empirical approaches of behavioural geography and cognitive science, and to draw and build on their findings, without abandoning the critical theoretical positions and more catholic methodologies enabled by human geography's diversity. In fact, the latter are necessary if economic geographers are to move beyond the limits of existing behavioural approaches to engage meaningfully with the context of economic decision-making.
In the study of pension decision-making, geographical approaches must do more than adumbrate local, regional or national differences, for example in preferences for different types of assets. While spatial patterns are interesting in their own right, they do little to shed light upon the origins and implications of diversity. As Sunley (2000, 498) points out in the UK context: 'The move to an individualised market regime is exposing variations in people's ability, willingness and opportunity to consume pensions, some of which are expressed geographically', but the reasons for spatial variations, which might include cultural and attitudinal differences, complexity and lack of trust, and a lack of surplus money, are not understood. Neither geographers nor economists have directly addressed the links between pension consumption and underlying assumptions about individual rationality, the capacity and desire for choice, and understanding of, and tolerance for, financial risk. As the example of pension decision-making by UK occupational plan participants illustrates, I will argue, it is an approach that draws on the strengths of behavioural and geographical epistemologies and methodologies that has the most to offer in terms of policy relevant research that takes account of both cognition and context in individual choice.
The UK picture
The contemporary British welfare state has been characterised as 'liberal' or 'residual' (Esping- Andersen, 1990 Andersen, , 1999 but the pension system itself, recognised as being one of the most complex in the world, is an historical artefact.
7 It embodies competing and contested notions of personal versus collective responsibility, individual choice versus social solidarity and voluntarism versus compulsion (see Clark, 2000 ; also Sass, 2006; Thane, 2006 on the evolution of employer pensions). Beveridge's 1946 'settlement' introduced a universal, contributory state pension, which was intended to pay benefits at subsistence level; although this goal was not achieved, the establishment of the system of national insurance was part of the post-war project of building a modern welfare state. In the aftermath of the economic upheavals of the 1970s, however, the governing ideology in the UK shifted away from social solidarity to an emphasis on the individual and the market as the loci of welfare. In the ideology of individualism '. . . active agents seeking to maximise their own advantage are both the legitimate locus of decisions about their own affairs and the most effective in calculating actions and outcomes' (Rose and Miller, 1992) . Rational agents each produce a flexible portfolio, which facilitates the maximisation of individual choice (McDowell, 2004, 146) .
In the case of occupational pensions recent trends have seen the decline of traditional DB plans as companies close existing schemes to new members and replace them-if they replace them-with less generous DC schemes (Clark, 2006) . These developments are linked with the broad shift in the British economy away from manufacturing and heavy industry, towards services, and with increased global financial integration and competition (Clark, 2003) . Overall levels of pension coverage have been falling except for those, many of them women, employed in the public sector (which has expanded in size since the Labour government came to power in 1997). Thus while the Government intends to provide a decreasing proportion of retirement income in order to control expenditure, private and occupational pensions are not developing to offset the state's retreating role: 'The underlying level of funded pension saving is falling rather than rising to meet the demographic challenge, pension right accrual is becoming still more 7 There is an extensive literature on the pension system in the UK and its current 'crisis'. For more in-depth discussions of the British system's tiers and their complexities see Davis, 1997; Disney, 2001; Gin, Street and Arber, 2001; Blake, 2002; Clark, 2003; Disney et al., 2003; Emmerson, 2003; Atkinson, 2004; Ward, 2004; Banks and Blundell, 2005 and Pemberton, 2005. unequal, and risk is being shifted to individuals sometimes ill-equipped to deal with it' (Pensions Commission, 2004, xi) .
Geographical research on pension decision-making
The discourse of individual choice and responsibility strongly influences both the UK Government's position (despite the recent policy shift in favour of a more generous Basic State Pension), and the design and ethos of DC occupational schemes, reflecting what Sunley (2000, 485) calls 'a spirit of individual freedom of choice and minimal constraints on markets'. The behavioural economics literature contains substantial evidence to the effect that many workers at companies with DC schemes make irrational decisions about joining (or not joining) company plans, especially where the employer matches contributions, about not contributing enough, overestimating the income their pension will provide in retirement, not understanding the tax implications of their savings behaviour, and failing to plan (see for example Bernheim, 1998; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Choi et al., 2001 Choi et al., , 2004 Scholz et al., 2004; Beshears et al., 2005) . Several recent studies by economic geographers on the attitudes and behaviour of plan participants and trustees have borrowed both methodological approaches and theoretical concepts from behavioural economics and cognitive science. In Clark et al. ( , 2007 , the insights of Kahneman and Tversky were the reference point for assessing the competence and consistency of pension fund trustees. Clark et al. began with a test-regime based upon already-identified problems in the literature on pension decision-making, applied to an undergraduate sample and a group of UK trustees who had volunteered for the project. The authors concluded that there was little difference between these two groups in terms of their decision-making competence, despite the fact that trustees are responsible for the long-term financial welfare of millions of DB occupational plan participants. A study by Clark and Strauss (in press) tested the significance of social identity and household structure in individuals' pension-related risk assessments. Using survey instrument designed to elicit respondents' attitudes towards decision-making with regard to risk and uncertainty it was found that expressed preferences were correlated with socio-demographic status and that having a partner with a pension entitlement makes a difference to risk propensity (all other things being equal). Equally importantly, the study found that low-income women with pensions are highly risk averse and appear to heavily discount the future. Finally, a third study in a similar vein by Knox-Hayes and Clark (2007) sought to assess spatial patterns of differentiation in decisions by retired British individuals with private pensions at different ages to purchase an annuity. The analysis utilised the results of a large-scale questionnaire, and it was found that the pattern of private pension asset ownership was significantly related to social status and the intended take-up of an annuity significantly related to the region of residence of respondents.
These studies usefully deployed insights from behavioural economics and cognitive science, such as heuristics (mental short cuts), while signalling the importance of sociodemographic characteristics and local pension cultures. However they fell short of building a broader understanding of the context of decision-making that encompassed, for example, local and regional processes of financial socialisation or the socio-political and economic constitution of differentiated pension cultures. There are two reasons for this. One is that the methods employed, while extremely useful, were also limited in the processes they illuminated. The second, related point is that none of the papers attempted to theorise the decision-making context. Contextual factors including social and spatial forms of embeddedness cannot easily be grasped through the application of experimental or quantitative empirical methods.
Mixed methods in research on decision-making
Arguments for mixed methodological approaches are nothing new in economic geography, and despite the association of feminist geographies with qualitative methods, some of the strongest advocates of combined approaches have been feminist geographers studying economic processes and patterns of inequality. McLafferty (1995) calls attention to the value of quantitative research in situating qualitative research in a broader context, and suggests that qualitative methods can be used to analyse embeddedness and then to identify subjects for quantitative analysis with larger samples (but see Moss, 1995 , on the challenges of quantifying the embedded practices of everyday life). She highlights the examples of Hanson and Pratt (1991) and Pratt and Hanson (1993) ; Hanson herself uses her work with Hanson and Pratt (1995) on gender and urban labour markets as an example of research that traces its origins to quantitative behavioural geography but integrates other methods into its overall framework, namely in-depth qualitative interviewing.
In what follows I use a fictional case to illustrate how a combined methodological approach might yield useful data on decision-making in an occupational DC pension plan within a single firm. The deployment of such useful fictions has precedents in economic geography [Clark's (1981) 'synthetic cases ' and Ettlinger's (2003) 'anecdotes']. The example I construct draws on the literatures in geography and sociology concerned with the effects of social welfare policy on individuals (see, for example, Ginn et al., 2001; Ginn, 2003; McDowell 2004 McDowell , 2005 Bellamy and Rake, 2005; Smith and Easterlow, 2005) , as well as on my own experiences of conducting research on pension decision-making within corporate DC plans in London. The case also shares certain features with the type of stylised facts used in economics. The details of the case are predicated on economic and social assumptions that are taken as axiomatic and which stand in for the 'real world', without the need for qualification or explanation.
The research problem involves understanding why employees within a single financial services company (ABC Insurance), which sells insurance products for the consumer market, make different decisions about whether to join the DC scheme and how much to contribute. The company is aware that many employees do not opt into the scheme, that few contribute the maximum amount despite tax advantages and contribution matching, and that most fail to make a choice about how their contributions are invested (meaning that their money is automatically put into a default option). The researcher, an economic geographer, is also be interested in understanding spatial and gendered patterns inequality within the DC scheme, and in considering the welfare issues that these patterns are likely to raise when the current workers are pensioners.
The case
Most of ABC's policies are sold direct over the telephone. It is a UK company with a limited international presence and it's operations in Britain are concentrated in two geographic areas: the City of London, where it's head office is located; and the outskirts of Glasgow, where it's major call centre operations are based. The company's corporate management, marketing, finance and product development personnel are centralised in London while the direct sales force and helpline operators and their managers are based in Glasgow. As illustrated in Table 1 , the workforce of ABC insurance is segmented according to location and function; the spatial patterns of differentiation are associated with different employee demographics and characteristics.
It is unlikely that the researcher would, in this instance, start with interviews. The management of ABC have provided her with a database containing information gleaned from the administration system for the pension plan, which lists those who have opted into the company's DC plan, those who have not, the contribution rates and total assets of plan participants, how long they have been members, and how often they change their investment strategy. She also receives details of the plan. It was established in 2003, when the company closed its existing DB plan to new members. There is no default enrolment and workers have 3 months from the date they join to opt-in; anecdotal evidence from ABC suggests that many say they were unaware of this timeframe, or didn't know whether to join or not, when asked about their decision after the fact. ABC matches contributions up to a maximum of 6% of salary, and plan participants are provided with a menu of eight funds in which to invest. The default option is a medium risk managed fund, which invests predominantly in bonds and UK mid and large cap stocks. Employees have web access to their DC accounts and costless switching is allowed, up to a maximum of four times per year. Part-time workers (those working fewer than 35 h per week) are ineligible for plan membership.
The researcher conducts some basic statistical tests and regresses plan membership (the dependent variable) against gender, job type, tenure, salary and geographical location. She observes a number of correlations: men, Londoners and those with higher salaries are more likely to belong to the plan than Glaswegian workers, tenure is not statistically significant and job type is significant at a low level. She then tests for interactions between gender and contribution level, total assets and the likelihood (Inman, 2005) . Lord Turner of the Pensions Commission has questioned unions' assertions that a retirement age of 67 or 68 for the BSP will penalise the poorest pensioners, claiming that by the time it is implemented longevity will have increased, in manner consistent with current trends, for all socioeconomic groups. The 2005 Turner Report does note, however, that the gap in life expectancy between income deciles is not narrowing but rather increasing at a parallel rate (Pensions Commission, 2005) .
of investing all of one's savings in the default option. She is not surprised to see that women contribute less and have fewer assets but notes with interest that women and men are equally likely to have all of their assets invested in the default option, and that the total percentages of plan participants following this strategy is high. She then runs a two-step regression to test the interaction of gender, job type and salary, and geographical location. She is intrigued to discover that women in Glasgow are less likely to belong to the plan even if they have similar types of jobs and earn similar salaries to women in London. Applying insights from behavioural economics and cognitive science, the researcher could draw the conclusion that the employees of ABC insurance evince a number of the traits identified in the literature, for example risk aversion, inertia and procrastination. She is interested, however, in the differences between women in the Glasgow and London offices. She suspects that imitation, and the particular pension cultures of the different locations, might play a role in the observed disparities. Beyond theorising, however, this hypothesis cannot be tested using the quantitative data available to her. She decides to conduct in-depth interviews with 10 women in each location: five at the junior administrative level (this designation includes call centre workers) and five at the managerial level (with at least four individuals reporting to them). She also holds focus groups at both locations, inviting all interested women staff to attend.
What emerges from this research is a picture of two very different decision-making contexts. First, levels of trust vary significantly. Workers and in Glasgow distrust 'the management', even managers themselves (most of whom are responsible for call centre teams), because of a decision the previous year to make a number of staff redundant. Employees in London are more likely to view themselves as part of a wider 'ABC team'. Second, although both groups are relatively risk averse in terms of their investment choices, the London women feel more 'comfortable' talking about and making judgements regarding financial projects. As one secretary puts it, 'We work in the City. We're surrounded by this stuff, there's even ads for them [pension funds] in the Tube'. Third, and unexpectedly, the researcher encounters differences in attitudes towards caring responsibilities, which seemed to impact on pension choices. As one call centre operative in Glasgow tells her, 'Six percent of my salary is money that I could use helping my mum out. Her [state] pension is nothing'. Glaswegian women were more likely to be contributing directly to the financial and physical maintenance of a close relative (not a child or spouse). Finally, although call centre operatives and their managers where grouped with other administrative (secretaries, personal assistants, clerks) and managerial workers in the context of ABC's system of employee classification, it becomes apparent to the researcher that the women themselves construct and experience their roles in very different ways. 'They may wear headsets too', a young Glaswegian worker tells her, 'but they [management] don't check up on the number of calls they [the London women] take in one day or how long it takes them in the loo. They have to dress smart but at least they can walk about'.
Conclusion
Behavioural economics has challenged strong assumptions about the rationality of individuals that underpin many models of economic decision-making, especially under conditions of uncertainty. Economists, psychologists and cognitive scientists have produced evidence documenting the ways in which the exercise of ideal-type rationality is bounded or constrained by the 'real-world' conditions in which choice occurs. For economic geographers uncomfortable with of the axioms of utility maximisation and the a-spatial nature of world in which decision-making is often taken to occur, this research provides common ground for more critical approaches. The importance of heuristics, imitation and intuition, and inconsistencies in attitudes to risk, all point to the importance of the context of decision-making. Yet behavioural economists, while acknowledging the importance of context, have in fact shied away from theorising and specifying contextual factors that arise from the interplay of the twin 'blades' of individual cognition and the decision-making environment, as expressed in Herbert Simon's famous metaphor of a pair of scissors.
According to Simon (1982) it is the 'accident of birth', in combination with individual cognitive limitations and the structure of the decision-making environment, which affects not only the outcomes but also the processes of decision-making. When decisionmaking takes place in the real world rather than in the 'near empty' one posited by economic and policy models, something more like 'social' decision-making occurs where values, alternative knowledges and preferences derived from interactions with the social and physical environment interact with the desire for a good-enough solution (Simon, 1983) . Moreover, as Sen (1982) has pointed out, acting as if in the best interests of others rather than solely to maximise personal utility can produce socially optimal outcomes, which reconcile rationality with morality subject to the cultural orientation of the individual.
The synthetic case set out to illustrate the utility of the concepts and methods of behavioural economics in the context of geographical research on economic decisionmaking but also to highlight, conversely, how the methods and concepts of economic geography have the capacity to enrich such research. A behavioural approach that engages seriously with the notion of context must do so at both the theoretical and methodological levels. So while this article has argued that mixed methodological approaches have untapped potential, especially in understanding pension decisionmaking, gathering qualitative data on attitudes, emotions, beliefs, relationships and the effects of certain places on individuals' economic choices is not enough. Economic geographers concerned with critiquing the rational actor model and theorising alternative rationalities have defined the context of decision-making in different ways. Not surprisingly, those influenced by the NES looked to other disciplines for their inspiration: Barnes and Sheppard (1992, 6) suggested that communities-defined as '. . . the geographical range of daily interactions through which shared beliefs develop'-must be treated as an integral element in the theoretical formation of consciousness. Miller (1992) drew on Habermas' concept of the lifeworld of the individuals as a way of getting to grips with differentiated rationalities. Hudson (2004) used Bourdieu's concept of habitus to suggest that decision-making needs to take into account class, action (as practice) and practical consciousness.
While all of the these approaches have merit, Gertler's (2003) account of context and tacit knowledge is particularly useful for understanding economic decision-making, including pension decision-making, because of its focus on institutions. Employing Karl Polanyi's notion of the social embeddedness of markets and agents, Gertler highlights the concrete institutional origins of routines, characteristics and patterns of thought. The examples he cites from the economic geography literature raise two main points: that context is in many cases largely defined by institutional factors, and that these influences are often subtle and pervasive such that individuals are not consciously aware of them. These points resonate with Simon's (1983) insights that institutions provide a stable environment that makes a 'modicum of rationality possible', but that limited (bounded) rationality also makes the design and operation of social institutions problematic. This would certainly seem true of pensions systems.
An approach to economic decision-making that combines insights from behavioural economics and cognitive science with both quantitative and qualitative methods and the theorisation of context, embeddedness and the role of institutions has, I believe, the capacity to produce a renewed behavioural economic geography. The challenge lies in applying it to 'real world' research problems of the type suggested by the pensions case: one I hope economic geographers will take up. As the example of UK occupational pensions shows, the stakes are high (Clark et al., 2005) . In a world of individualised risk, responsibility and choice, some individuals are likely to be worse off in old age not because they make less rational decisions than others in similar situations, although this might sometimes be true, but because the context of their retirement planning is very different. Current pension policy is likely to produce greater inequality for future retirees (just as the Labour government's economic policies are now creating greater disparities in wealth between those of working age). This is not to deny the serious challenges posed by demographic changes and globalised competition for government and occupational pension regimes. But the question is whether adequacy and equality are more desirable than individual choice if real-world pension decision-making under conditions of uncertainly, combined with existing structural inequalities and inherent cognitive limitations, is likely to produce large benefits for the most affluent and increasingly insecure retirement incomes for the rest.
